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ABSTRAcT The right to health has been widely recognized in the Argentine courts, 
however only those who have the ability to access the justice system are able to fully 
enjoy that right. Therefore traditionally excluded groups, who for different reasons 
have not been able to make their demands heard in a judicial court, do not benefi t 
from the recognition gained up to this point in the different judicial resolutions. Taking 
into account these institutionalized unequal practices, this article suggests a model for 
understanding the right to health truly as a right. A distinction is made between the 
right to health as a rule (understood as the minimum or essential core of that right) and 
the right to health as a principle (understood as the periphery of the right). In this way, 
it is shown how considering the right to health as both a rule and as a principle could 
offer greater equality in recognition of that right for disadvantaged groups that lack ac-
cess to the justice system.
KEy WoRDS Right to Health; Social Justice; Redistributive Justice; Social Group.
RESUMEN El derecho a la salud ha sido fuertemente reconocido por los tribunales 
argentinos, pero lo cierto es que solo goza de dicho derecho quien tiene posibilidad 
de acceder a la justicia. Por lo tanto, los grupos tradicionalmente excluidos, que por 
diferentes motivos no pueden hacer oír sus reclamos en sede judicial, no se benefi cian 
con el reconocimiento logrado hasta ahora en las diferentes resoluciones judiciales. 
Teniendo en cuenta estas prácticas desigualitarias institucionalizadas se plantea aquí un 
modelo que implica entender el derecho a la salud como verdadero derecho. Para esto 
se realiza una distinción entre el derecho a la salud como regla (en lo que se refi ere al 
contenido mínimo o esencial de dicho derecho) y el derecho a la salud como principio 
(respecto del contenido periférico), demostrándose así cómo el derecho a la salud 
considerado como regla y como principio podría llegar a otorgar mayor igualdad en el 
reconocimiento de este derecho respecto de los grupos desaventajados, que carecen de 
acceso a la justicia.
PAlABRAS clAVES Derecho a la Salud; Justicia Social; Justicia Redistributiva; Grupo 
Social.
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INTRoDUcTIoN
The World Health Organization defines health 
as a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being, that at its core constitutes an essential 
right of every individual (1). According to the Ar-
gentine Constitution as well as several international 
treaties on human rights, the right to health cannot 
be understood in isolation given that it coexists with 
other rights and the mandate of equality. Therefore, 
this paper will examine the thesis that the right to 
health must be enjoyed under conditions of struc-
tural equality of opportunities (2-11). 
But, how can a structural equality of oppor-
tunities guarantee the effective exercise of the 
right to health within contexts of social exclusion? 
This question pertains to the problematic nature 
of the specification of the content of social rights 
in general, and in particular of the right to health. 
Accordingly, it is possible to argue that one way 
of guaranteeing such equality is to establish clear 
methods to determine a “minimum core” and 
other content beyond this threshold that could be 
called “peripheral content.” That being said, it is 
widely accepted that social rights demand State 
action; nevertheless, one argument commonly 
raised against the full enforcement of these rights 
is the difficulty in determining the extent of these 
positive obligations (12-13). Although this diffi-
culty is taken on by a large body of literature, it 
seems that there is still a need to develop a more 
thorough, founded approach to social rights (14).
The aim of this paper is to contribute to some 
extent to this objective, through a contemplation 
of the nature of the rules or principles of State ob-
ligations to provide healthcare services implied by 
social rights. For this purpose, the discussion will 
be informed by the distinction between rules and 
principles found in Alexy’s A Theory of Constitu-
tional Rights (12). Special reference will be made 
to the right to health as part of the body of social 
rights recognized by the Argentine Constitution 
and other documents.
This paper is divided into three sections: the 
first will briefly elaborate on the tensions that 
emerge when dealing with social rights, empha-
sizing the problem of (in)equality characteristic of 
the development of social rights through judicial 
decisions. The second section will consider the 
implications of the model of rules and principles 
through an analysis of the principle of propor-
tionality or weighing, employing the concept 
of a “rule-oriented weighing model” (ein reger 
orientiertes Abwägungsmodell) developed by 
Clérico as a distinction between mere weighing 
and ad hoc balancing (15,16). Thus, the purpose 
of this paper is to establish which of these models 
should be applied in the resolution of cases that 
involve social rights (more precisely, the right to 
health) or whether they can be taken together as 
a single model, wherein the application of the 
right to health as a rule or as a principle varies 
depending on the case in question. In the third 
section, some conclusions will be presented re-
garding the need to achieve a more egalitarian 
acknowledgment of the right to health, and how 
the proposed model represents a driving force in 
this direction.
SocIAl RIGHTS: ‘PRoBlEMS’ 
ASSocIATED WITH SocIAl RIGHTS
Mere mandates or true rights?
Although much has been written in this field 
about the scope of social rights, the debate still 
remains open. It should be mentioned that this 
paper will only take into account a few of the cri-
tiques of the concept of ‘social rights’ (17-20). In 
this regard, some legal scholars posit that social 
rights develop progressively – that is to say, they 
are mere mandates that should be gradually de-
veloped by legislators. Consequently, the progress 
of social rights would result from the creation and 
planning of public policies, and therefore entirely 
in the hands of lawmakers. From this perspective, 
social rights are by nature incomplete rights, and 
as such cannot be invoked in courts of law.
Two significant characteristics would result 
from this interpretation: generality and depen-
dence on budgetary resources. On the one hand, 
it is argued that the generality of statements 
establishing social rights require a regulatory 
framework in order to determine the extent 
of the benefits involved – in order words, the 
aim of the right in question. This feature affects 
claims made in the courts given that the content 
of the right is not specified.
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On the other hand, the connection between 
social rights and budgetary resources should also 
be mentioned. These resources are managed ex-
clusively by political actors and not by the justice 
system. As has been noted elsewhere:
… when the compensation resulting from the 
violation of economic, social and cultural 
rights entails positive State action and the mo-
bilization of budgetary resources, or that said 
compensation affects in any way the design 
or implementation of public policies, or im-
plies making a decision to determine which 
social sectors or groups will be prioritized for 
State assistance, courts tend to consider these 
issues to be the jurisdiction of the political 
system. (13 p.127) [Own translation]
Thus, many courts contend that it is largely 
impossible for them to influence policies that may 
affect budgetary resources.
It is widely accepted that the field of social 
rights is governed by the principles of progressive 
realization and non-regression. The principle of 
non-regression compels States to fully uphold 
the status of a right, and to ensure compliance 
once its scope and content have been fully 
determined.
If any deliberately retrogressive measures 
are taken, the State party has the burden of 
proving that such measures have been intro-
duced after the most careful consideration 
of all alternatives and that they are fully jus-
tified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and within the 
framework of full use of the State party’s 
maximum available resources. (21)
Similarly, the principle of progressive realization 
involves:
...the adoption of measures, especially those 
of an economic and technical nature insofar 
as there are available resources – by legisla-
tion or other appropriate means – with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realization 
of certain economic, social and cultural rights. 
(22 p.34)
Thus, both principles imply not only the ob-
ligation of the State to adopt policies that improve 
the status of the rights and to further define their 
scope, but also to avoid decisions that could lead 
to a reduction in their degree of realization (23).
In other words, States have the duty to move 
as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards 
full compliance – in the case of the right to heath – 
with Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (24). 
However, States may not limit their actions 
to the mere establishment of a baseline of rights 
given that the provision of the social benefits 
derived must be progressive, meaning that they 
must gradually develop and cannot remain static 
in relation to other social benefits. Therefore, the 
principles of progressive realization and non-
regression are essential to strengthen the stan-
dards of enforceability since the State is required 
to demonstrate that all possible resources have 
been made available in order to fulfill the right in 
question. Hence, any regressive measure must be 
grounded on sufficiently strong reasons (22).
These principles – progressive realization 
and non-regression – have been used by legal 
scholars and applied in jurisprudence to rein-
force the legal standing of economic, social and 
cultural rights (ESCR) (25). Consequently, prior 
consensus that social rights were mere mandates 
addressed to legislators has eroded. Nowadays, 
ESCR are considered genuine rights that must be 
guaranteed to the fullest extent possible, making 
possible their claim before courts, and at the same 
time, it must be ensured that individuals have ad-
equate resources for the protection of these rights. 
Therefore, although States have a certain degree 
of discretion in terms of the strategies chosen to 
ensure that these rights are fulfilled, they have 
the obligation to act progressively. Accordingly, 
not only must the State avoid interfering with the 
exercise of individual rights, but it also has the 
obligation to produce positive actions in order to 
prevent them from becoming ineffectual. This is 
evidenced by the ruling of the Argentine Supreme 
Court in the case of “Asociación Benghalensis” 
(26). Similarly, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 32/130 sets forth that:
1. a) All human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; 
134 RoNcoNI lM
SA
LU
D
 C
O
LE
C
TI
V
A
, B
ue
no
s 
A
ire
s,
 8
(2
):1
31
-1
49
, M
ay
 - 
A
ug
us
t, 
20
12
Universidad Nacional de Lanús | Salud Colectiva | English Edition ISSN 2250-5334 | E-ISSN 1851-8265| ISSN-L 1669-2381
equal attention and urgent consideration should 
be given to the implementation, promotion and 
protection of both civil and political and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights; b) the full re-
alization of the civil and political rights without 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural 
rights is impossible... (27 p.160-161)
In conclusion, the right to health acknowl-
edged as a true right has been broadened by both 
legal scholarship and individual judicial decisions. 
Therefore, the State is now under the obligation 
to guarantee this right. Undoubtedly all progress 
in this matter is significant, but other problems 
may also arise, which will be taken up in the next 
section.
Effects on equality when issuing rulings in 
cases involving the right to health
Courts have certainly made progress in the 
acknowledgement of social rights, consistently 
providing arguments in support of the position that 
these rights are enforceable (a), especially in the 
context of the right to health (b). In recent years 
there has been an increase in both individual and 
collective litigation aimed at ensuring the effective 
fulfillment of the right to health despite non-com-
pliance by either national or local governments 
(c), and in some cases even by individuals, in 
addition to important cases of judicial activism 
oriented towards ensuring greater guarantees of 
these rights (34). For example, in the “Comunidad 
Toba del Chaco” case, the Ombudsman filed a 
class action lawsuit against both the provincial 
government of Chaco and the federal government 
after 19 people died of malnutrition, a legal ma-
neuver that intended to compel the provincial 
and federal governments to take all necessary ac-
tions to modify the present living conditions of the 
indigenous communities of the region that have 
been repeatedly and systematically deprived of ad-
equate humanitarian and social assistance, leading 
to a situation of silent, progressive, and systematic 
annihilation. The Ombudsman also petitioned the 
court to order both the provincial and federal gov-
ernments to guarantee these communities a dig-
nified quality of life such that they may effectively 
enjoy the rights to life, health, medical and social 
assistance, food, drinking water, and education as 
well as to housing, general welfare, work, social 
inclusion, and so on, and to see that these rights 
are continuously and permanently satisfied. Other 
examples illustrating this point are the case of 
“Asociación Benghalesis y otros c/ Ministerio de 
Salud y Acción Social, Estado Nacional s/amparo 
ley 16.986” dated June 1, 2000; and the case of 
“Ministerio de Salud y/o Gobernación s/acción de 
amparo” dated October 31, 2006.
However, this issue must be approached cau-
tiously. When dealing with social rights, although 
a judicial resolution might benefit one individual 
or group, this situation could be regarded as un-
equal treatment if all individuals and groups do not 
benefit in a similar fashion. Thus, it is necessary to 
take into account the inequalities imposed by this 
system, given that some social groups (especially 
those most vulnerable) do not see their rights 
protected, even though they do not bring claims 
before the State. On the other hand, although “the 
Supreme Court assumes the role of protector of 
rights in particular cases, this does not solve the 
larger problem arising from inaction or omission 
in regards to the functions that correspond to the 
other two branches”(35). In other words, there are 
a large number of conflicts that for different reasons 
(lack of legal knowledge, economic difficulties, 
lack of time, distrust in the government or the legal 
system, dependence of families’ income on discre-
tional social welfare) will never be brought before 
the courts (36,37 p.315). This situation becomes 
even more complex when the affected social 
groups suffer from structural inequalities (econom-
ically disadvantaged groups, women, indigenous 
peoples, etc.). A good example of this is the Ramos 
case (38), in which a claim was brought before 
the court by an unemployed, single mother living 
in “conditions of extreme poverty” with her eight 
children, aged between nine months and fifteen 
years old, in a modest home that had been lent to 
her free of charge. One of her daughters, Mariana 
S. Ramos, had to undergo an operation because of 
a congenital heart disease. The girl, who suffered 
from malnutrition, could not be operated on even 
once she got an appointment at Garrahan Hos-
pital, due to her mother’s lack of economic means 
to transport her to the hospital and difficulties in 
finding someone who could care for her other 
children. Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that 
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in addition to the conditions of extreme poverty 
she faced, she had deficiencies in education and 
consequently she and her children were immerse 
in conditions of structural poverty that would be 
impossible to overcome without the assistance of 
the State. It was argued that her children would 
not be able to complete schooling and that they 
suffered from malnutrition – some even exhibiting 
developmental disabilities – due to the inadequate 
intake of quality food. Therefore, she requested 
that the court order the federal and provincial gov-
ernments to: a) respect their rights (hers and her 
children’s) ensuring that they had access to food, 
healthcare, education, and adequate housing, 
all of which would result in the provision of an 
“adequate, effective and continuous food aid on 
a monthly basis” and which would enable them 
to meet their basic needs and to attain a decent 
standard of living; b) provide her daughter, 
Mariana S. Ramos, with the medical care neces-
sitated by her condition and to remove the ob-
stacles which had made it impossible for her to 
fully and effectively exercise the right to health; 
and c) provide her six school-aged children with 
the necessary elements (clothing, shoes, books, 
school supplies and transportation costs) to attend 
school. The Argentine Supreme Court ruled that 
the State cannot be sentenced to grant additional 
benefits or social services to the filing party – who 
was head of a household of eight and living in 
conditions of extreme poverty – given the prior 
availability of a similar social program (for single 
mothers with more than seven children) and 
in light of the fact that access to education and 
healthcare is already guaranteed. Consequently, 
it is possible to conclude that “the social groups 
who suffer from structural inequality and social ex-
clusion are the primary victims of this institutional 
deficit that affects their political, social and civil 
rights” (36 p.300, 39). Furthermore, it is worth 
mentioning that although promising progress 
has been made in particular cases regarding the 
acknowledgement of social rights (especially the 
right to health), the efficiency of the system should 
be called into question.
As a result, in Argentina only those who can 
afford it effectively exercise the right to health; 
that is, those who receive healthcare coverage 
through the social security sector, private health 
insurance companies, or those whose right has 
been acknowledged by an administrative or court 
order. Unfortunately, not everyone has enough 
money to afford healthcare, even fewer have 
employer-provided health insurance coverage, 
and only a limited number of people manage to 
access the justice system.
In Argentina, between 3 and 5 million indi-
viduals hold private health insurance (coverage 
purchased on the private market) and approxi-
mately 15 million are covered by the social se-
curity sector (40). Therefore, we can argue that 
almost half the population (of over 40 million 
people) lacks coverage and relies on public 
hospitals:
…the absence of integration among the dif-
ferent subsectors – the public, social security 
and private sectors – is characteristic of the 
[healthcare] system, and it is further exacer-
bated by the fact that each subsector is highly 
fragmented. The overall picture gets more 
complicated since the public sector is divided 
into jurisdictions – national, provincial and 
municipal – among which the degree of co-
ordination is not adequate. (41 p.62) [Own 
translation]
Thus, only those able to access to the 
legal system are guaranteed to have their right 
to health respected, which in turn requires not 
only an awareness of the possibility of bringing 
claims before the court, but also an investment 
of the money and time necessary for initiating 
and carrying out legal proceedings. Although 
free counseling services exist in many districts 
of the country they are generally located in large 
cities, and people who live in underserved areas 
are unable to access these services. Indeed, 
free counseling services have been available at 
public universities since the beginning of the 
20th century (for example, at the Universidad 
de Buenos Aires), and through NGOs working 
with these issues, but unfortunately they are far 
from meeting the societal demand. Thus, it be-
comes clear that a minimum core of the right to 
health must be determined, essential not only 
for the Judiciary, but also for the other principal 
actors involved in the process of acknowledging 
the right to health (legislators, national and pro-
vincial executives acting as administrators of the 
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national and provincial public health systems, 
respectively, and the different subsectors of the 
healthcare system). Accordingly, it is stated in 
subsection 47 of General Comment No. 14 “that 
a State Party cannot, under any circumstances 
whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with the 
core obligations set out in paragraph 43 above, 
which are non-derogable” (42). This brings 
us to the second issue: the establishment of a 
“minimum core” of the right to health accessible 
to all citizens.
RUlES, PRINcIPlES AND THE “RUlE-
oRIENTED WEIGHING MoDEl”
As indicated at the beginning of this paper, 
the difficulties arising from cases involving social 
rights, especially the right to health, include: 1) 
determining when medical treatment is necessary 
(therefore obligating the healthcare system to 
provide coverage), given that the right involved 
might otherwise be affected; 2) issues of structural 
equality implied by the development of social 
rights through court orders, considering that disad-
vantaged groups still remain largely affected. Thus, 
this paper suggests making a distinction between 
the interpretation of the right to health as a rule and 
as a principle. There are undoubtedly treatments 
that are urgent and necessary and as such should 
not be denied to any person: namely, those cases 
in which the life of the patient is at risk (d). These 
cases are characterized by “the obligation of the 
State to take immediate action, as otherwise not 
only is the right to health violated, but also the right 
to life” (44). Furthermore, it should be noted that 
“the denial of a minimum level of medical assis-
tance and treatment would enter into conflict with 
the assurance of a dignified standard of living […] 
and as such incompatible with the right to life” (45 
p.218). The obligation to comply with this right is 
undeniable. In these cases, following Robert Alexy, 
it can be argued that the right to health acts as a 
rule (12). German scholars have extensively taken 
up theories concerned with outlining the content 
of rights (relative, absolute, spatial theories, etc.) 
(12,15,17,46,47). However, it should be noted that 
the intent of this paper is not to construct a philo-
sophical argument concerning the content of social 
rights, but rather to promote the equal recognition 
of these rights in social and legal practices.
It is widely accepted that a rule “is a limi-
tation to a fundamental right whenever, once in 
effect, […] a permanent non-freedom or non-right 
of equal content appears” (12 p.274). Rules have a 
definitive character in that they may be complied 
with or not; that is, the solution is implicit in the 
rule itself: for example, when driving a car it is 
mandatory to stop at stoplights, this is a definitive 
obligation. In such cases, the subsumption model 
applies and not the weighing of rights: “norms re-
garding the minimum core of social rights apply 
as rules (subsumption model). The minimum core 
of the right cannot be weighed or ranked against 
other principles” (44).
It is for this reason that a theory of the core 
content of rights is adopted (e). This implies 
complying with the terms of General Comment 
No. 14 (42) concerning the existence of certain 
basic non-derogable obligations. These obliga-
tions are included in the core content (f) of the 
right to health, which is inalienable. That is, in 
the cases of certain conditions or diseases (this 
will be further discussed later), the State must 
provide treatment and cannot under any circum-
stances justify a failure to do so (claiming, for 
instance, that resources were allocated to attend 
to other problems) since, in such cases the right 
to health includes this core content, an essential 
minimum that cannot be neglected by the State or 
by individuals. An example of this would be the 
right of HIV-positive people to receive treatment 
(properly administered and under adequate con-
ditions) provided by the healthcare system. Such 
treatment cannot be denied on the grounds that 
resources are limited or that complying with this 
obligation would compromise the financial re-
sources of the entire system.
Having said that, it should be noted that 
the existence a minimum core of rights does not 
equate to a denial of the possibility of broadening 
the scope of these rights, given that this broader 
scope may also be enforceable in a court of law 
(44 p.494, 49 p.57). Nonetheless, there are some 
circumstances in which the need for treatment is 
more questionable, primarily because the health 
of the individual would not be at risk as in previ-
ously mentioned cases, but rather cases in which 
the condition in question does not pose a threat 
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to the life (existence) of the individual. Such cases 
fall outside the scope of what has been defined 
as the minimum core, even though other rights 
may be affected, such as the right to health – as 
defined by the WHO (1) in a general sense – to 
dignity, and to integrity. Nevertheless, these cases 
undoubtedly affect the right of the individual in 
question to live a dignified life, a right that is ulti-
mately protected in all democratic societies.
Legal scholars have designated these cases 
as “difficult cases” (17). To illustrate this point, 
the following questions arise when considering 
this definition of difficult cases: Should the State 
provide assistance for fertility treatment or breast 
implants? Should private insurance companies 
be required to cover the cost of plastic surgeries 
(50,51)? This is where the right to health acts 
as principle. In this regard, the doctrine of fun-
damental rights has established that “principles 
require that something must be realized to the 
greatest extent possible, bearing in mind the legal 
and real possibilities” (52 p.20). Thus, principles 
are considered prima facie obligations, and not 
definitive mandates as in the case of rules. Alexy 
posits that “principles lack resolution within their 
content with respect to opposing principles and 
real possibilities” (12 p.99). That is to say, he un-
derstands principles as optimization mandates. 
Hence, in the event of a conflict between a “part” 
of a particular right with other fundamental rights, 
the solution is provided by weighing the mag-
nitude of the principles in question (g).
A collision between two principles is resolved 
by establishing a conditional relation of prece-
dence between the principles taking into ac-
count the circumstances. The circumstances 
under which one principle takes precedence 
over another constitute the establishment of 
a conditional relation of precedence. Under 
other circumstances, the issue of precedence 
can be resolved inversely. (12 p.92) (italics in 
original) [Own translation]
This implies that a principle may be disre-
garded when it enters into conflict with a more 
significant principle because:
…as opposed to the minimum core, the 
periphery [the realm in which the right to 
health acts as a principle] may be restricted, 
according to the needs derived from other 
rights, benefits or interests that are acknowl-
edged in the Constitution or that are relevant 
to social life. (17 p.411) [Own translation]
However, some important clarifications re-
garding the proposed model must be mentioned.
How is the core content established when 
the right to health is considered a rule?
Although an exhaustive casuistic analysis of 
these issues is beyond the scope of this article, 
an attempt will be made to provide some guide-
lines to contribute to the construction of a more 
comprehensive model of the right to health both 
as a rule and as a principle. Accordingly, it has 
been stated that “setting adequate parameters or 
indicators […] can contribute to the task of de-
termining when economic, social and cultural 
rights have been violated” (54). Therefore, some 
basic guidelines will be set forth below in order 
to establish the core content of the right to health. 
In this sense, Victor Abramovich and Cristian 
Courtis state that:
…even without regulation, some criteria must 
be followed to determine the scope of these 
rights. Thus, the concept of minimum core or 
core content – developed both in scholarship 
and jurisprudence – provides a good starting 
point for doing so […] This means that when 
the other branches of government fail to define 
the core content of social rights, the courts can 
rule on this neglect based on these – or some 
other – criteria. (55 p.31) [Own translation]
Therefore, the minimum core is defined as 
follows:
1. All medical treatments and/or drugs necessary 
to ensure human life. That is, all treatments 
and/or drugs that must be given when a human 
life is at stake (44 p.1-34). In this regard, as the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights stated, “General Comment No. 3 […] 
confirms that States parties have a core obli-
gation to ensure, at the very least […] essential 
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primary health care” (56). This, in turn, implies 
providing access to basic foodstuffs and potable 
water, supplying necessary drugs (for example, 
to people suffering from cancer), setting up 
healthcare centers adequate in terms of structure 
and accessibility, etc.
2. Medical treatment related to individuals re-
quiring special protections. As per Article 75, 
Section 23 of the Argentine National Consti-
tution as well as the doctrine created by the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia (57), all cases 
related to the health of children (h), women 
(regarding sexual and reproductive health), the 
elderly, people with disabilities, patients with 
terminal conditions (for example, some HIV 
patients) (i), and indigenous peoples fall under 
this category. Thus, the protection of the health 
and well-being of these individuals is within 
the scope of the minimum core that the State 
must comply with.
3. All cases deemed by the legislature to be cases 
of mandatory compliance. In Argentina, the 
minimum core that the national healthcare 
system must comply with is set in the Com-
pulsory Medical Plan (CMP) [Programa Médico 
Obligatorio] (j). In this respect, Alexy points 
out that “fundamental rights […] can only be 
restricted through, or on the basis of, constitu-
tional laws. Thus, restrictions of fundamental 
rights are always either constitutional laws or 
laws of lower hierarchy which allow for the 
enactment of constitutional laws” (12 p.277). 
As a result, legislators – or in some cases the 
courts – have the authority to set the content of 
fundamental rights.
4. All circumstances in which the repetition of 
rules occurs as a result of a weighing process. 
In this regard, the rule-oriented weighing model 
proposed by Clérico (15) is worth mentioning, 
given that rules permit the universalization of 
the results of a given weighing process. Fur-
thermore, subsequent collisions of principles 
may not need to be submitted to the weighing 
process, provided that the case in question can 
be subsumed under a prior rule produced by a 
weighing process. Under such circumstances 
no weighing is carried out in practice (15). In 
this sense, it is important to discuss the concept 
of a network of rules resulting from weighing 
processes, in conjunction with the principle 
of progressive realization already mentioned. 
Rules resulting from weighing processes play an 
essential role in determining the minimum core 
of social rights, since by virtue of the principle 
of non-regression, once the scope of a right has 
been asserted it cannot be turned back. It should 
be noted that this “superior” recognition may 
be either general (for example, when a certain 
treatment is acknowledged by the legislature) 
or individual (when this is done, for example, 
through a court decision). The fact that repeated 
court decisions grant access to a given treatment 
after applying a weighing process demonstrates 
that the society considers and demands that 
said treatment should be included as part of the 
minimum core. Conversely, after a number of 
similar court decisions, the legislature or the ex-
ecutive may guarantee the treatment of all cases 
by way of a law or an executive order, respec-
tively. Recent cases include the incorporation of 
gastric bypass surgery into the CMP (Law 26,396 
of 2008) and assisted reproductive treatments in 
the context of the Province of Buenos Aires (Pro-
vincial Law 14,208 of 2011). Hence, in accor-
dance with the repetition of judicial decisions, 
when dealing with cases in which an individual’s 
health is at stake, all subsectors of the healthcare 
system must acknowledge that right. Therefore, 
consistent with rules resulting from weighing 
processes, if a new case of similar tenor is pre-
sented, the individual should not be forced to 
file a claim in court to guarantee the protection 
of that right (that is, a judge should consider the 
right to treatment by applying the principle of 
proportionality). Rather, the healthcare provider 
is expected to go beyond the wording of the law 
(in this case, the CMP) and provide an adequate 
solution to the patient. For instance, if an em-
ployer-based insurance provider has repeatedly 
been ordered to cover the costs of gastric bypass 
treatment for patients with morbid obesity and 
a new request for treatment is presented by a 
morbidly obese patient (in accordance with the 
diagnosis of the attending physician), it is incon-
sistent with the law that this patient should be 
forced to file a similar claim. Thus, rules that 
have taken shape through jurisprudence become 
a part of the minimum core.
5. The opinion of specialists. The judgment of 
specialists plays an important role due to its 
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crucial impact when prescribing treatment 
that is medically necessary for the patient and 
not purely for aesthetic reasons (for example, 
in the case of a gastric bypass). Consequently, 
Alegre posits that “any omission on the part of 
healthcare professionals is morally tantamount 
to an action – in this case, an obstruction of 
the realization of the right to health” (59). In 
such instances, the healthcare provider (that 
is, the hospital director, insurance company, 
etc.) must consider and act in accordance with 
the specialist’s indications. Other specialists’ 
opinions may be requested, where relevant, 
in order to assess whether the treatment is 
necessary or not. Following these criteria, in 
the event that a patient needs urgent medical 
attention, services or treatments not included 
in the CMP must be provided, and after the 
fact health insurance institutions may take 
legal action against the State, as the ultimate 
guarantor of the right to health. When dealing 
with situations related to the right to health, 
financial considerations (profits) should not 
prevail over this right or the life of the person. 
The level of urgency may be assessed by a 
healthcare team working independently from 
the patient’s healthcare provider. The State will 
establish in each case whether the costs are to 
be reimbursed or not, taking into account that 
neither private health insurance companies 
nor the institutions of the social security sector 
should operate solely from a business logic 
(by evaluating all revenues garnered by the 
healthcare provider during the time that the 
beneficiary – client – has been paying for their 
services). Under no circumstances can the 
costs be passed on to the patient when what 
has been previously identified as the minimum 
core is at stake. 
In light of these considerations, and taking 
into account the principle of progressive real-
ization included in the realm of social rights, the 
objection that the minimum core would become 
solidified cannot be raised (15). This minimum 
core merely establishes a baseline, given that 
States are required to make progress toward fuller 
acknowledgment of social rights. Similarly, the 
core content should not be taken as a fixed and 
unmovable object, but rather as a flexible one 
open to the inclusion of other contents into the 
minimum core (by widening the spectrum of the 
right to health taken as a rule).
Finally, in the event that the minimum core 
is not satisfied, penalties to healthcare agents 
(insurance providers, hospital directors, health 
ministers, etc.) should be established that would 
compel them to provide the required services (15). 
Such penalties could include fiscal or tax-related 
measures, removal from office, or any other action 
that may make the access to the right to health ef-
fective and available to citizens. 
How is the weighing process put into 
practice?
In a previous paper I analyzed at length 
the implementation of a proportionality test ap-
plied to a specific instance of the right to health 
(access to assisted reproductive treatments) (50). 
Therefore, it is worth mentioning that when a 
proportionality analysis leads to the conclusion 
that this treatment is appropriate and relevant, a 
“proportionality test strictly speaking” should be 
applied. To do so, the abstract and specific weight 
of every competing principle must be taken into 
account. A wide variety of arguments may be put 
forth in order to determine the weight of these 
principles. However, it is important to take into 
account the significance of the right to health 
given its close relationship with other rights (in-
tegrity, dignity). In cases where the right to health 
as a principle is compromised, its weight will be 
significant and strong arguments against it must 
be provided. In turn, the greater relative impor-
tance attributed to the right to health is a conse-
quence of the obligation that States have to act 
progressively in its realization.
It should be noted that utilitarian arguments 
cannot form the basis of rulings. Therefore, ques-
tions pertaining to the number of people that will 
benefit from or be affected by a given measure, or 
to the number of people that could potentially be 
helped if this treatment were not afforded by the 
State should not be posed. Nevertheless, a cost-
benefit analysis is often implicit in the reasoning 
behind rulings. A utilitarian approach violates the 
rights of groups since it ignores or minimizes the 
particular characteristics of minority groups in the 
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name of general welfare (60). In this respect, it has 
been argued that:
…utilitarian criteria violate persons’ rights. 
Not only is the access to certain treatments 
which are strictly necessary from the medical 
point of view denied, but also […] the right 
to equal opportunities is disregarded: people 
suffer from discrimination due to circum-
stances beyond their control. (61) [Own 
translation]
As a result, utilitarian criteria must not be 
employed in cases involving the minimum core 
of the right to health (k). Although these criteria 
may be included among the arguments put forth 
in any particular case, their weight is not signif-
icant or decisive (62).
Thus, the right to health is composed of a 
minimum irrevocable core and a “peripheral” 
content. Although it may be weighed against 
other rights, the arguments invoked to justify the 
exclusion or failure to develop the content of the 
right to health must be sufficiently well-founded.
Resources: implications of considering 
the right to health both as a rule and as a 
principle
As has been argued above, the right to health 
has a certain minimum content that the State 
must comply with and a peripheral content that 
is subject to a weighing process. However, the 
argument most frequently cited to justify the non-
fulfillment of social rights is the lack of resources 
(with reference to both the core and peripheral 
contents) (l). It has been observed that the State 
cannot meet all demands, and thus some rights 
will not be fully realized (63 p.105). This line 
of argument is evident in the ruling of the South 
African Constitutional Court in the case of Soo-
bramoney vs. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 
(64). The appellant, a 41-year-old unemployed 
man, suffered from diabetes, ischemic heart 
disease, and cerebrovascular disease that caused 
him to have a stroke. Unfortunately, his condition 
was irreversible and by the time he brought his 
case to court he was in the final stages of chronic 
renal failure. His life could have been prolonged 
by means of standard renal dialysis, treatment that 
he sought from the Renal Unit of Addington Hos-
pital located in Durban. However, the hospital 
could only provide dialysis treatment to a limited 
number of patients (the renal unit had 20 dialysis 
machines available). Thus, only patients eligible 
for kidney transplants gained admission to the di-
alysis program. The appellant was not eligible and, 
therefore, he did not meet this requirement. The 
Court found that a decision could not be reached 
regarding the acceptability of these criteria, but 
concluded that if all people in South Africa who 
suffered from chronic renal failure were to be 
provided with dialysis treatment – many of them 
require it three times a week, as would have been 
the case of the appellant – the cost of providing 
treatment would produce substantial increases in 
the health spending. Additionally, if this principle 
were to be applied to all patients claiming access 
to costly medical treatments or drugs, the health 
budget would have to be dramatically augmented 
at the expense of other areas to which the State 
must attend. Therefore, it should be noted that the 
availability of resources creates serious difficulties 
for the exercise of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ESCR).
In this manner, the scarcity of resources can 
be a pernicious argument used to justify a wide 
range of situations. It is generally agreed that the 
resources the State has to ensure the fulfillment 
of social rights are limited but not scarce, at least 
when it comes to the minimum core that the State 
is obligated to guarantee. Regarding the distinction 
between a limitation and a scarcity of resources, 
the former term is preferred since it makes ref-
erence to the fact that these resources are finite – 
they have a limit, an end point. Scarcity, however, 
seems to imply that there are less resources than 
necessary. Similarly, it could be argued that a 
scarcity of resources would also affect civil rights, 
since the protection of private property, freedom 
of speech, etc., require resources – as is the case 
for social rights. It is clear, then, that the concept 
of scarcity actually refers to the lack of public pol-
icies that prioritize social issues.
While my intention is not to open a debate on 
how the State should invest limited resources, it is 
important to note that this argument has frequently 
been used to circumvent compliance with what 
has been established as the minimum core of given 
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right. Paragraph 9 of the Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
establishes that minimum core obligations “apply 
irrespective of the availability of resources” (65). 
Although the availability of resources is limited, 
this does not justify non-compliance on the part of 
the State, or more specifically a lack of structured 
planning intended to take on the problems im-
plicit in ESCR. That being said, “it is important to 
distinguish inability from unwillingness of a State 
to comply with its obligations” (65).
It is possible to identify an example that 
emerges from customary practice in this field. A 
2009 report by the Civil Association for Equality 
and Justice [Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y 
la Justicia] (66) detailed the poor conditions of 
the education system in the southern area of the 
City of Buenos Aires (an area mainly inhabited 
by low-income people), in comparison with 
the superior conditions present in the northern 
area of the city. Thus, this raises the question: 
if resources are limited, why do so many differ-
ences exist among schools within the same city? 
Shouldn’t schools from these two areas show 
similar conditions? Therefore, it is clear that the 
argument of a shortage of resources is unsat-
isfactory. Often, rather than a limitation of re-
sources, governments lack a systematic approach 
to the allocation of these limited resources (67), 
with this omission disproportionately affecting 
those suffering from structural inequalities and 
who, as previously mentioned, effectively lack 
access to the justice system in order to ensure 
their rights are protected.
Although it is widely accepted that resources 
should be utilized rationally, the core content 
of rights must be preserved. In this sense, a sys-
tematic approach is necessary in order to effec-
tively address problems related to the right to 
receive health services under structural equality 
of opportunities.
The significance of the proposed model
The significance of this proposal which dis-
tinguishes between rules and principles pertains 
mainly to the situation of rights-bearing individuals, 
especially individuals or groups that lack access to 
the justice system. This lack of access results in 
institutionalized discriminatory practices (68, 69), 
since higher income sectors are better equipped to 
access the justice system, file claims in court, and 
have their rights acknowledged. However, this is 
not the case for poor and marginalized sectors, 
since in most cases they do not even have access 
to the above-mentioned minimum core. This sug-
gests that the distinction made between the right 
to health considered as a rule and as a principle 
would not be as relevant if it were not for the fact 
that, in practice, the right to health is systemati-
cally denied to disadvantaged groups.
Thus, if the right to health is taken as a prin-
ciple, and a person must petition the executive or 
the justice system in order assess the scope of their 
rights, this should not be necessary with regards to 
the minimum core since the person’s life would 
be at stake. The proposal outlined here is that the 
minimum core must be respected at the adminis-
trative level (by healthcare providers) without the 
need for a court decision in order to guarantee 
this right. It is important to emphasize that al-
though a large number of variables (political, eco-
nomic, scientific, etc.) influence the health sector, 
healthcare providers must act in compliance with 
the right to health and “secondary” factors should 
not be considered as relevant as rights. So, when 
a claim to access a certain treatment is presented, 
common practice among healthcare providers 
should not be the denial of treatment but rather 
the compliance with that right and, at most, the 
discussion of the best way to facilitate access to 
the treatment in question. Certainly, the definition 
of the core content of the right is a step in the right 
direction since healthcare providers would have 
prior awareness of what is expected in this sense.
In this respect, once a physician or an ad-
ministrative authority has evaluated a situation in-
cluded as part of the minimum core, the State has 
the obligation to act urgently without requiring 
any further assessment of the circumstances. To 
illustrate this point, for example, in the case of a 
group of malnourished children in the province of 
Chaco (m), once the situation has been confirmed 
the State (provincial, national, or both) must act re-
gardless of which one of them must fulfill that obli-
gation (a question of jurisdiction). Similarly, in the 
event that a certain medical condition has already 
been demonstrated, health insurance providers 
(both in the social security and private subsectors), 
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must act accordingly and cannot argue that the 
treatment is not included in the Compulsory 
Medical Plan or claim other administrative issues. 
All secondary factors related to the right to health 
and the right to life may be further discussed after 
the provision of treatment.
The distinction between the right to health 
as a rule and as a principle exists because im-
minent risk to a patient’s life (existence) differs 
from a situation that may broadly affect the right 
to health. This argument is contrary to the position 
held by numerous scholars that consider it pos-
sible to limit social rights, despite only allowing 
restrictions that have passed the strict scrutiny of 
reasoning (70 p.124). The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights stated that:
The right to life is a fundamental human right, 
and the exercise of this right is essential for 
the exercise of all other human rights. If it is 
not respected, all rights lack meaning. Owing 
to the fundamental nature of the right to life, 
restrictive approaches to it are inadmissible. 
In essence, the fundamental right to life in-
cludes not only the right of every human 
being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, 
but also the right that he will not be pre-
vented from having access to the conditions 
that guarantee a dignified existence. States 
have the obligation to guarantee the creation 
of the conditions required so that the viola-
tions of this basic right do not occur and, in 
particular, the duty to prevent the agents from 
violating it. (71 p.40)
Therefore, in the cases falling under the scope 
of the first model (rule), the healthcare provider 
or legislator cannot carry out a weighing process, 
but rather has the obligation to act urgently in 
order to effectively ensure access to the claimed 
right. Nonetheless, in cases related to the second 
model (principles), which are equally important 
and distressing from the patient’s perspective, the 
weighing of principles is required.
Similarly, the determination of the core con-
tent is useful in the definition of indicators of pro-
gressive realization (49 p.55). Under Article 19 
of the Protocol of San Salvador, the States parties 
must submit periodic reports on the progressive 
measures they have taken to ensure due respect 
for the rights set forth in the Protocol. In this re-
spect, it is essential to have a minimum core in 
order to measure a country’s improvements and 
setbacks in terms of social rights, particularly the 
right to health. Without this minimum core, it is 
not possible to evaluate the implementation of 
progressive measures taken to guarantee the right 
to health.
coNclUSIoNS
Although progress must still be made in the 
acknowledgement of social rights, specifically the 
right to health, it is necessary to bear in mind that 
the current system is insufficient given that some 
groups lack access to justice. Thus, the State, as 
guarantor of last resort of the right to health, must 
adopt effective and consistent measures that take 
into account power asymmetries within society to 
ensure the effective exercise of the right to health. 
Accordingly, a socially mindful interpretation of 
the principle of equality necessitates a non-neutral 
State, capable of recognizing social and cultural 
differences and of taking positive or corrective 
measures in order to compensate for disadvan-
tages or imbalances experienced by certain mar-
ginalized groups or sectors of the society (as put 
forth in Article 75, Section 23 of the Argentine 
National Constitution) (34 p.268).
Along these lines, it should be pointed out 
that the dilemma is not whether to expand access 
to justice or to improve the healthcare system . An 
expanded access to justice is necessary to allow 
marginalized groups to present claims regarding 
their rights, but this is insufficient when the life 
of a person or even a group of people is at stake. 
Therefore, the acknowledgement of social rights 
solely by the justice system should not be re-
garded as satisfactory. Although the Judiciary can 
be a decisive actor in safeguarding the rights of 
marginalized groups, the resolution of such cases 
rarely has universal or structural implications, but 
rather these judicial decisions in general benefit 
the petitioner or petitioners. Moreover, the costs 
borne by the State must be also taken into con-
sideration (costs that could be reduced if people 
were not forced to file claims for the protection 
of their rights). In this respect, as has been noted: 
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“only through universal policies is the inalienable 
minimum core guaranteed, which in turn fosters 
further guarantees of equality and non-discrimi-
nation” (37 p. 307).
Consequently, the right to health should be re-
garded both as a rule and as a principle. Although 
this model is open for debate, particularly re-
garding the core content of the right, this proposal 
is generally preferred to the idea which suggests 
that all rights and contents can be weighed, given 
that this can exacerbate the inequalities described 
above. It has become evident that the core content 
is difficult to establish with clarity and legal vigor 
(taking into account, for example, that the right to 
health is in constant tension with technological de-
velopment and the healthcare industry). Therefore, 
although this model may not completely eliminate 
the practical difficulties related to healthcare, it con-
stitutes an effective tool that can help healthcare 
providers act in the interest of constructing a more 
egalitarian access to the right to health.
In this respect, the concept of the right to 
health as a rule and as a principle must not only 
be applied in courts, but perhaps more impor-
tantly by legislators and healthcare providers. In 
conclusion, following Dworkin (73): if rights are 
to be taken seriously, it must be asserted that 
social rights have an inviolable core that should 
be respected by both governmental bodies (the 
legislature, the judiciary and the executive) and 
by individuals. This means that the minimum core 
should not be disregarded, and more importantly 
that it must be developed under conditions of 
structural equality.
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ENDNoTES
a. In Argentina, works can be consulted from the 
Civil Rights Association [Asociación de Derechos 
Civiles] (28), The Center for Legal and Social Stud-
ies [Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales], and 
at the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Case 
Law Database (ESCR-Net).
b. In this sense, the pioneering judicial decisions 
made by the Argentine Supreme Court are: “Cam-
podónico de Beviascque, Ana Carina c/ Ministerio 
de Salud y Acción Social – Secretaría de Programas 
de Salud y Banco de Drogas Neoplásticas” dated 
October 24, 2000; “Monteserín, Marcelino O. c/ 
Estado Nacional” dated October 16, 2001; “Etch-
everry, Roberto E. c/ Omint Sociedad Anónima 
de Servicios” dated March 3, 2001; “Hospital Bri-
tánico de Buenos Aires c /Estado Nacional (Minis-
terio de Salud y Acción Social)” dated March 31, 
2001. Precedents set by these judicial decisions 
have been quoted in several occasions by both the 
Supreme Court and lower courts, which in turn 
have broadened the scope of protection. Regard-
ing jurisprudence in this field, refer to Clérico (31), 
Clérico y Scioscioli (32), and others.
c. For information on the distribution of obligations 
among the national and provincial governments rel-
ative to the right to health as well as the Argentine 
Constitutional Reform of 1994, see Clérico (33).
d. According to the classification of Herbert Lionel 
Adolphus Hart, these can be considered as “easy 
cases” since, at first glance, it can be assessed 
whether it falls within the scope of the regulation 
intended to be applied (17 p.140). The following 
authors explicitly apply the concept of easy cases: 
Clérico (39 p.30), Clérico and Scioscioli (45)
e. In this regard, Article 19 Subsection 2 of Ger-
man Federal Law establishes that under no cir-
cumstances can a fundamental right be affected 
in its core content (19.2 In keinem Falle darf ein 
Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet 
werden). In Argentina, the concept of core con-
tent of rights is provided in Articles 14, 28 and 99 
(Section 2) of the Argentine National Constitution, 
related to the rules and regulations of rights and 
the spirit of the laws. A right is altered or modified 
when its core is compromised. It should be noted 
that the term “core content” is preferred to “mini-
mum core,” since at first sight the latter suggests 
something small whereas the former indicates 
something more important (substantial) that may 
not be minimum.
f. Rodolfo Arango, referencing the social rights in 
general and quoting the jurisprudence of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court, refers to vital minimum 
rights. He states that these “ensure the satisfac-
tion of basic needs of all human beings...” (45 
p.212). Similarly, it has been pointed out that “this 
minimum core might not be easy to define, but 
includes at least the minimum decencies of life 
consistent with human dignity. No one should be 
condemned to a life below the basic level of digni-
fied human existence. The very notion of individ-
ual rights presupposes that anyone in that position 
should be able to obtain relief from a court” (48 
p.22-23). 
g. “The principle of proportionality is applied 
when a regulation supporting a fundamental right 
shall be fulfilled and validated” (12). Other addi-
tional references are Clérico (15) and Bernal Pu-
lido (17 p. 138). Cases of omission or inadequate 
action are called prohibition of insufficient protec-
tion (Untermassverbot). Regarding the prohibition 
of insufficiency in the field of health, see Clérico’s 
application and development of this concept 
(38,53).
h. These were the criteria of the Argentine Supreme 
Court in the cases of Lifschitz (June 15, 2004) and 
Maldonado (November 23, 2004), among others.
i. These were the criteria adopted by the Argentine 
Supreme Court in the cases of Hospital Británico 
and Asociación Benghalensis.
j. The Compulsory Medical Plan (CMP) consists 
of “a set of mandatory and basic health services 
which under no circumstances should people be 
deprived of” (as set forth by National Ministry 
of Health Resolution 939/2000 and Resolution 
201/02, related to the extension of the Emergency 
Compulsory Medical Plan (ECMP) [Plan Médico 
Obligatorio de Emergencia] resulting from the Na-
tional Declaration of Health Emergency (Federal 
Executive Order 486/2002) and its modifications 
by the National Ministry of Health and Environ-
ment (Resolution  1991/2005), among others. The 
CMP has been constantly updated either by means 
of the enactment of laws, passing of resolutions or 
judicial decisions (58). It is worth mentioning that, 
although the CMP unified the healthcare services 
that providers should comply with, its implemen-
tation brought about several problems that were 
taken to court; for example, regarding the disease-
free period (preexisting conditions) set by health 
insurance companies both in the social security 
and private subsectors (for instance, as set forth in 
the case of “Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores 
c/ Compañía Euromédica de Salud S.A.,” by the 
Argentine Supreme Court decision dated April 8, 
2008); also, regarding ceilings on healthcare ser-
vices not affected by subsequent modifications 
(for instance, as provided in the case of “Cambiaso 
Péres de Nealón Celia M. A. y otros c/ Centro de 
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Educación Médica e Investigaciones Médicas,” by 
the Argentine Supreme Court decision dated Oc-
tober 28, 2007), etc.
k. This is the case with the precautionary measure 
issued by Civil and Commercial Court No. 2 dated 
October 2, 2010 by which the Ministry of Health 
was ordered to bear all costs of Aquiles Víctor 
Hugo Misiti’s cancer treatment since he did not 
have health insurance and whose treatment was 
worth ARS 45,000 per session. The patient was 
given conventional chemotherapy treatment with 
no positive results. The patient was then advised 
to be treated with “hepatic arterial chemoemboli-
zation using drug-eluting beads.“ The court stated 
that “due to the plaintiff’s condition treatment 
must be administered without delay” (Statement 
of reasons reference IV). Thus, the court ordered 
to “administer immediately, fully and continu-
ously the treatment and medication prescribed 
by the physician.” Therefore, the court set aside 
utilitarian considerations and rejected arguments 
related to the shortage of resources (although the 
costs of the treatment were high). Faced with the 
possibility of affecting what we have described as 
the minimum core, the court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
l. The National Supreme Court concluded that an 
eventual financial deficit does not constitute suf-
ficient grounds for not fulfilling a core obligation. 
See the cases of “Hospital Británico de Buenos Ai-
res c/ Estado Nacional” dated March 31, 2001 and 
“Unión de Usuarios y Consumidores c/ Compañía 
Euromédica de Salud S.A.” dated April 8,2008.
m. Legal proceedings were brought against the 
Argentine province of Chaco and the Federal 
Government by the Ombudsman before the Na-
tional Supreme Court due to the severe malnutri-
tion, lack of access to drinking water and insuf-
ficient access to healthcare services suffered by 
the indigenous Toba community. Refer to the 
Argentine National Supreme Court of Justice case 
“Defensor del Pueblo de la Nación c/ Estado Na-
cional y otra (Provincia del Chaco) s/ Proceso de 
Conocimiento,” decision dated September 18, 
2007.
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